Sudan, violence, Power and nonviolence

The country of Sudan has been at war with itself for nearly 30 years. The North and South fought initially over resources and power within the government. Recently the south was able to gain a measure of autonomy, and the fighting has shifted west, to the Darfur region of Sudan. As a result of both the civil war, and the genocide (both perpetrated by the Northern government), hundreds of thousands have been killed, and millions have been displaced. Here we see a textbook example of Galtung’s “violence triangle,” or the relationship between cultural violence, structural violence, and direct violence. With the conflict in Sudan as our example, we will examine the power structure of the conflict, the violence triangle as it relates to the conflict, and nonviolent tactics that could be used to bring about peace.
As is the case with many ex-European colonies in Africa, Sudan does not exist along traditional tribal or geographical lines. As a result there is a division between the northern region, which is largely Muslim, and the southern and western regions which largely Animist. This religious division is the cause for the cultural violence in Sudan. Sudan’s religious cultural violence has many facets and drivers to it. Galtung argues that “With god outside us, as God, even ‘above’ it is not inevitable but indeed likely that some people will be seen as closer to that God than others, even as ‘higher.’” Galtung also outlines a table of “chosen“ and “unchosen” peoples: “His people, upper classes, [and] True believers” are all chosen while “colored [people], lower classes, [and] Heretics, Pagans” are all un-chosen. This is precisely the case in Sudan. The north is seen as superior because it is wealthier (centered around the capital city of Khartoum, and situated close to Egypt for optimal trade) northerners consider themselves to be God’s people because they are racially Arab rather than African, and they are “true” believers, believing in Allah and Mohammed. The rest of the country is considered inferior because they are not wealthy (though they have the majority of Sudan’s natural resources) they are racially African, and they are considered pagans. These are all used as justification for the genocide being committed against the west and south by the northern government. The government funds and supplies militias called the Janjaweed. It is the job of the Janjaweed to carry out the government’s plans for ethnic cleansing, in an attempt to keep the government’s hands clean of the bloodshed. However, government troops work closely with the militias, providing support with attack helicopters and heavy bombers. In this situation Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, holds the power (though we will see later that there are larger institutions and parties which hold a great amount of power as well). Al-Bashir took power in 1989 in a military coup and immediately allied himself with radical Islamic groups, setting the stage for the violence to come. Al-Bashir holds a great amount of power as president; however, because of an indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court he sees his power as being threatened. As a result Sudan held its first democratic election in 20 years last month. From the start, this election was seen as a fraud. Suspicions of it being rigged, fear of violent retribution, and the protest of the election by key opposition groups made it illegitimate from the start.
Sudan’s structural violence is rather simple. The north wants the valuable natural resources of the south, and to attain these it exploits what resources it can, remove forcefully, exploits the people of southern and western Sudan, and attacks the identity and freedom of the south and west. This process of exploiting and destroying the racial identity of the south and west fragments the population, displaces the people and leaves the natural resources largely open for the taking. Sudan does much of this through a racial cleansing campaign. The economic structure of Sudan is largely what keeps this policy in place. Sudan straddles the line between Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa. Basically what it comes down to is the South has raw materials, and the north does not. In order to secure these resources it is important for the north to keep the south disorganized and on the run.
The direct manifestation of the violence in Sudan is killing, maiming and destruction of lively hood and culture. The north does this, as stated above, through the Janjaweed, and ethnic violence. The Janjaweed militias, as well as government troops sweep through areas killing, rapping, and burning. Refugees flood into neighboring countries to live in the squalor of displaced person camps. In this way the genocide in Sudan affects its neighbors. The country of Chad has even declared war on Sudan because of the militia violence, and the burden of the refugees. When it comes to the direct violence of genocide, Sudan’s power comes from outside its borders: From China. As I have alluded to previously, Northern Sudan lacks natural resources; the South and West do not. One of these resources is oil, which China, as an industrialized nation needs a great deal of, and is happy to get from Sudan in exchange for attack helicopters, heavy bombers, guns, and ammunition. The United Nations, as week as it maybe when it comes to genocide, is made even weaker by China. Because of its need for oil China blocks all UN sanctions against Sudan, even though Omar al-Bashir received indictments from the International Criminal Court just last year.
Against overwhelming violence what can the people of Southern and Western Sudan do in resistance, particularly nonviolent resistance? There is a divestment campaign going on worldwide which demands that companies withdraw their economic backing from Sudan, and that individuals withdraw their backing from companies that do invest in Northern Sudan. If China could be compelled to participate in this campaign the genocide would come to a swift halt. International trade embargoes would go far as well. Southern Sudan will participate shortly in a vote for sovereignty. If this vote is successful Southern Sudan, theoretically, will be allowed to secede from Northern Sudan. This is likely the South’s best bet for human rights. For Darfur the situation is much more bleak. Their future may rely on outside influence. Perhaps if some support from citizens in the North could be rallied then there may be hope, though the North experiences economic success and has little reason to oppose their dictator. To gain foreign support Darfur will need to make more of a media spectacle than the thousands of raped and murdered have thus far created. Referencing Sharp’s 198 methods it seems fitting that they might use some of the measures of honoring the dead, perhaps mock funerals, homage at burial places and demonstrative funerals might bring media attention, as well as a measure of closure to those that have survived these 20+ years of death. It is tempting to suggest that the oil pipelines that run to the northern ports be sabotaged; however in light of the military strength, and the ruthlessness of the government this is most certainly not an option. What Sudan needs most is an international intervention. Embargos, divestment, peacekeeping forces to protect the rights of the people to vote, these are the measures needed for peace in Sudan. Then we might begin to address the culture of violence that exists in the North
Sudan is a difficult situation. The power structure is difficult to strike at because it is apathetic at best. The Sudanese government only cares about profits, as do the people of the north. China certainly is not concerned with human rights, and worse still is that it blocks any effort at addressing them. The International Criminal Court has its foot in the door, but can do nothing without a police force to carry out its sentence. It is largely up to international citizens to at least spearhead the beginning of Sudan’s nonviolent movement. The Sudanese are to dispersed by the violence to be able to create any sort of solidarity, and certainly functioning too low on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to think of anything more than immediate survival.